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### ■ BATTLE COMMAND FOCUSED ROTATION PROGRAM OBJECTIVES ■

This guide is a direct product of the Battle Command Focused Rotation (BCFR) program. The BCFR program has grown for the need to understand how commanders develop and execute battle-focused leadership and battle judgment. Development of a battle command benchmark from which the Army can develop competencies and enabling technologies will ensure the ability to meet future requirements of Force XXI. This effort will ensure that the Army understands and prepares commanders to execute battle command, and concurrently, to maximize the Army's investment in information-age technology. *Battle command cannot simply be viewed as a check-list but must be understood as an art based in knowing and doing high payoff actions on the battlefield. Battle command is more than command and control.*

In August 1993, the BCBL received tasking from the Commanding General, Training and Doctrine Command (CG TRADOC), to conduct a program of battle command focused combat training center (CTC) rotations. The program's intent was to correlate what battle commanders do, what we train them to do, and what research is doing to assist them.

### BCFR PROGRAM OBJECTIVES

- Identify systemic problems in battle commander development
  - Battle commander competencies
  - Battle commander information shortfalls
  - How the art of battle command is taught, coached, and mentored
- Recommend solutions through DTLOMS for the identified problems
- Increase the focus on, and understanding of, the art and concept of battle command

## ■ BATTLE COMMAND DEFINITION (FM 100-5, *Operations*) ■

Battle command is defined as the art of battle decision-making, leading, and motivating soldiers and their organizations into action to accomplish missions. It includes visualizing the current state and future state, formulating concepts of operations to get from one to the other, and doing so at least cost. Assigning missions, prioritizing and allocating resources, selecting the critical time and place to act, and knowing how and when to make adjustments during the fight are also included.

## ■ BATTLE COMMAND COMPONENTS (FM 100-5, *Operations*) ■

### LEADING

- Being competent and confident
- Inspiring soldiers with the will to win
- Providing purpose, direction, and motivation
- Taking responsibility
- Being loyal
- Inspiring and directing subordinates
- Establishing a team-work climate
- Demonstrating moral and physical courage
- Providing vision of future courses of action


### DECIDING

- Knowing if to decide, & when & what to decide
- Anticipating activities that will be put into motion
- Knowing how irrevocable some commitments will be
- Knowing the consequences of deciding
- Anticipating outcomes
- Providing vision of future courses of action (COAs)

## TENETS OF BATTLE COMMAND (BCBL PAM 2.1)

A tenet is a basic truth held by an organization.

A commander's success on and off the battlefield depends on his ability to operate in accordance with nine basic tenets:



## DYNAMICS OF BATTLE COMMAND (BCBL PAM 2.1)

■ Six primary elements determine the effectiveness of the battle commander's actions:

- Leadership
- Decision-making (discussed as battle command components)
- Information assimilation
- Visualization
- Conceptualization
- Communication.

## BATTLE COMMAND FOCUSED ROTATION PROGRAM FINDINGS

### BATTLE COMMANDERS COMPETENCIES

- Battle commanders do not know and understand Army doctrine for the employment of the BOS. The problem is most intense with the following:
  - Field Artillery
  - Air Defense
  - Mobility/Counter mobility
- Battle commanders do not know and understand Army doctrine for the combat function processes. The problem is most intense with the following:
  - Intelligence preparation of the battlefield
  - Course of action development and analysis
- Battle commanders lack knowledge and understanding of enemy doctrine and capabilities. They do not understand how to use:
  - Intelligence estimates
  - Enemy course of action development
  - Order of battle
- Battle commanders cannot use, and do not understand, the decision-making process
- Battle commanders lack the ability to visualize the end state that drives the process of setting conditions for success
- Battle commanders cannot clearly articulate vision and commander's intent
- Battle commanders do not have the ability to synchronize the battlefield
- Battle commanders lack the ability to manage available resources or conduct trade-offs
- Battle commanders lack the ability to balance versatility, agility, and flexibility with synchronization to synchronize the battlefield
- Battle commanders do not have the individual habits and self-discipline that are the traits of a successful commander
- Battle commanders lack dynamic battlefield visualization

**INFORMATION FLOWS AND SHORTFALLS**

- Battle commanders are not able to systematically manage key information requirements
- Battle commanders do not understand the linkage between commander's critical information requirements (CCIR), commander's decisions, and the command and staff decision making processes
- Battle commanders do not understand the sources of information on the battle-field
- Battle commanders cannot maintain horizontal, vertical, bottom-up, and diagonal information flow, regardless of the command support relationship
- Battle commanders are not able to maintain information flows in garrison to improve their stock of baseline knowledge

**FOCUS ON HOW WE TEACH, COACH, AND MENTOR BATTLE COMMAND**

- Battle commanders do not take advantage of training opportunities that allow teaching, coaching, and mentoring battle command in garrison
- Battle commanders do not have a general level of battle command knowledge
- Battle commanders do not have the ability to provide focused feedback, based on actual performance directed at battle command competencies
- Battle commanders are not provided the quantities of opportunities to learn the art of battle command
- Battle commanders are not provided the use of virtual, constructive, and live simulations to reinforce battle command competencies
- Battle commanders do not know how to conduct focused, one-on-one battle command after-action reviews
- Battle commanders have not developed teach, coach, and mentor capabilities for interaction generated by cause and effect observations